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PERMISSIBILITY IS THE ONLY FEASIBLE DEONTIC PRIMITIVE
Johan E. Gustafsson
How many concepts do we need in ethics? Take the basic deontic concepts, that
is, moral obligation and permissibility. Do we need both of these concepts in
our ethical theorizing, or could we make do with just one of them?1 A standard
view is that these concepts are interdefinable—that is, either of them could be
defined in terms of the other. On this view, either of obligation and permissibil-
ity could serve as a deontic primitive, allowing the other concept to be defined
in terms of this primitive. More specifically, obligation and permissibility are
usually thought to be interdefinable with the following duality definitions:2
(1) It is obligatory to φ =df it is not permissible to not φ.
3
(2) It is permissible to φ =df it is not obligatory to not φ.
4
Part of the appeal of these definitions is the compelling idea that deontic modal-
ities, such as obligation and permissibility, are related in the same way as alethic
modalities, such as necessity and possibility.5 Necessity and possibility are usu-
ally thought to be interdefinable with an analogous pair of duality definitions:6
(3) It is necessary that p =df it is not possible that not p.
7
(4) It is possible that p =df it is not necessary that not p.
8
Together, these definitional schemes reflect the intuitive analogy between deontic
and alethic modalities.9
In this paper, I shall argue that neither (1) nor (2) works. Roughly, the
problem is that a claim that some act is obligatory or permissible entails that
there is a moral law, but the existence of a moral law is not entailed by a nega-
tive claim that some act is not obligatory or that some act is not permissible.
Nevertheless, one direction of the interdefinability could (potentially) be sal-
vaged. I shall argue that, if we are willing to leave out the conceptual possibility
of moral dilemmas, then there is a plausible way to define obligation in terms of
permissibility. So permissibility is the only feasible deontic primitive.10
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1. The varieties of obligation and permissibility
We shall be concerned with particular (rather than universal) obligation and
permissibility. Bengt Hansson reminds us that
Just as “it is obligatory to do p” often means “it is obligatory for everyone to
do p” the phrase “it is permitted to do p” often contains a tacit “for everyone”.11
It is universally obligatory to φ if and only if, for each person, it is obligatory for
that person to φ. And it is universally permissible to φ if and only if, for each
person, it is permissible for that person to φ. These more universal notions are
not interdefinable.12 To see that universal obligation is undefinable in terms of
universal permissibility, assume that there are just two people, Alice and Bob.
And compare the following two cases, where Alice and Bob each face a choice
whether to φ or to not φ: In the first case, it is permissible for each of Alice and
Bob to φ, and it is only permissible for Alice to not φ. In the second case, it is
permissible for each of Alice and Bob to φ, and it is permissible for no one to
not φ. It seems then that, in the second case, it should be obligatory for everyone
to φ whereas, in the first case, it is not obligatory for everyone to φ (it is only
obligatory for Bob). So these cases differ in terms of universal obligation. Yet, in
terms of universal permissibility, there is no difference, because it’s permissible
for everyone to φ in both cases and in neither case is it permissible for everyone
to not φ. Hence we have a difference in terms of universal obligation which
cannot be accounted for in any difference in terms of universal permissibility.
To see that universal permissibility is undefinable in terms of universal obli-
gation, we consider a third and a fourth case, where again Alice and Bob each
face a choice whether to φ or to not φ: In the third case, it is permissible for
each of Alice and Bob to φ, and it is permissible for each of Alice and Bob to
not φ. In the fourth case, it is only permissible for Alice to φ, and it is only per-
missible for Bob to not φ. Then it seems that, in each of the third and fourth
cases, it is not obligatory for everyone to φ (in the fourth case, it is only obliga-
tory for Alice) and it is not obligatory for everyone to not φ (in the fourth case,
it is only obligatory for Bob). So these cases are equivalent in terms of universal
obligation. But they differ in terms of universal permissibility, because, in the
third case, it is permissible for everyone to φ but, in the fourth case, it is not
permissible for everyone to φ (it is only permissible for Alice). Hence we have
a difference in terms of universal permissibility which can’t be accounted for in
any difference in terms of universal obligation.
Moreover, we shall be concerned with unilateral, rather than bilateral, per-
missibility. A unilateral permission and a bilateral permission to φ each entail
that it is permissible to φ. The difference is that a bilateral permission to φ
also entails that it is permissible to not φ, whereas a unilateral permission to
φ does not entail (nor rule out) that it is permissible to not φ.13 If we take per-
missibility to be bilateral permissibility, we must give up the duality definitions.
Neither obligation nor unilateral permissibility is definable in terms of bilateral
Permissibility Is the Only Feasible Deontic Primitive / 119
permissibility.14 To see this, compare a first case, where it’s both obligatory and
permissible to φ but neither obligatory nor permissible to not φ, with a second
case, where it’s neither obligatory nor permissible to φ but both obligatory and
permissible to not φ. These cases differ in terms of obligation and permissibility
but are equivalent in terms of bilateral permission, because in both cases nei-
ther to φ nor to not φ is bilaterally permissible. Hence we have a difference in
obligation and permissibility that cannot be accounted for in any difference in
bilateral permissibility.
Finally, we shall be concerned with moral obligation and moral permissi-
bility rather than personal directives. It seems clear that the duality definitions
do not hold for personal commands and permissions. A child who has neither
been commanded to not smoke nor been forbidden to smoke cannot thereby
plausibly claim to have been permitted to smoke.15 In general, it seems that one
could have been permitted to do some act φ without having been commanded
anything. Yet that one hasn’t been commanded anything does not entail that
one has been permitted to φ. So there can be a difference in what one has been
permitted to do without there being any difference in what one has been com-
manded to do. Hence having been permitted is undefinable in terms of having
been commanded. To see that having been commanded is undefinable in terms of
having been permitted, consider a first case where you haven’t been commanded
anything and you have only been explicitly permitted to φ. So you have neither
been permitted to not φ nor been prohibited to not φ. Compare this first case
with a second case where you have been commanded to φ and explicitly per-
mitted to φ. In terms of what you have been permitted to do, the first and the
second case are equivalent, yet they differ in terms of what you have been com-
manded. Hence having been commanded is undefinable in terms of having been
permitted.
2. Moral Error Theory
A first problem with (1) and (2) is that they rule out Moral Error Theory,
that is, the view that all first-order moral claims are uniformly false.16 While
Moral Error Theory is controversial, it shouldn’t be ruled out by conceptual
fiat. Moral Error Theory seems reasonable at least to the extent that affirm-
ing it does not seem to involve a simple misunderstanding of the basic deontic
concepts.17
To see the conflict between Moral Error Theory and the duality definitions,
note first that Moral Error Theory entails that, for any act φ, first-order moral
claims such as its being obligatory to φ, its being obligatory to not φ, its being
permissible to φ, and its being permissible to not φ are uniformly false. But, if
its being obligatory to φ and its being permissible to not φ are both false, the
definiendum of (1) is false while the definiens of (1) is true. Hence (1) rules
out Moral Error Theory. Likewise, if its being permissible to φ and its being
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obligatory to not φ are both false, the definiendum of (2) is false while the
definiens of (2) is true. Hence (2) also rules out Moral Error Theory.18
This problem also applies to the standard interdefinability of prohibition
and permissibility:19
(5) It is forbidden to φ =df it is not permissible to φ.
20
(6) It is permissible to φ =df it is not forbidden to φ.
21
As we have seen, Moral Error Theory entails that it is false that it is permissible
to φ and false that it is permissible to not φ. Moral Error Theory also entails
that it is false that it is forbidden to φ and that it is false that it is forbidden
to not φ. So Moral Error Theory entails that the definienda of (5) and (6) are
false while their definientia are true. Hence (5) and (6) also rule out Moral Error
Theory.22
It may be objected that, given (1) or (2), only one of its being obligatory to
φ and its being permissible to φ is a first-order moral claim; and likewise that,
given (5) or (6), only one of its being permissible to φ and its being forbidden to φ
is a first-order moral claim. If we, for example, adopt (2), then the claim that it
is permissible to φ could arguably be understood as a second-order claim, since
it is defined as the negation of the first-order claim that it is obligatory to not φ.
But this objection highlights a further problem with (1), (2), (5), and (6), namely,
that it seems that the claims its being obligatory to φ, its being permissible to φ,
and its being forbidden to φ all seem to be first-order moral claims, rather than
mere negations of first-order moral claims. It is especially implausible that its
being obligatory to φ or its being forbidden to φ wouldn’t be first-order moral
claims. Hence this objection can’t plausibly save the interdefinability of (1) and
(2) or that of (5) and (6).
It may next be objected that it is less clear whether its being permissible
to φ is a first-order moral claim.23 Remember, however, that we are talking
about moral permissibility—or, equivalently, moral rightness.24 A claim that
an act is morally permissible or morally right seems to entail that the act has
the moral property of being morally permissible or of being morally right.25
Since Moral Error Theory is typically motivated by the thought that there are
no moral properties, it seems that claims that some act is morally permissible
should be included on the list of first-order moral claims that Moral Error The-
ory rejects.26 There seems to be a difference between a view where everything is
permissible and a view where no acts have any moral properties or deontic sta-
tuses. Moreover, even if there is a reasonable version of Moral Error Theory
which is neutral with respect to permissibility claims, my argument only requires
one version of Moral Error Theory which rejects all claims that any acts are per-
missible and that that version is reasonable at least to the extent that it doesn’t
rely on a simple confusion about the concepts of obligation, permissibility, or
prohibition.
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3. The moral import of permissibility
The idea that permissibility is something stronger than a mere negation of a
first-order moral claim is closely related to Georg Henrik von Wright’s worry
about the interdefinability of some deontic concepts:
It seems much more plausible to regard [obligation] and [prohibition] as being
interdefinable than to regard [permission] and [obligation], or [permission] and
[prohibition], as being so. One can ask: is permission to do something simply
the absence of prohibition to do this same thing? That permission should entail
the absence of a “corresponding” prohibition seems clear. But does the reverse
entailment hold? Is not permission something “over and above” mere absence
of prohibition? 27
Von Wright supports this worry with a legal example: Suppose that some acts
have recently been enabled by some new technology that the legislators have
not considered. According to von Wright, these acts would be neither legally
permitted nor forbidden; there would be a gap in the legal code.28 But, if some
new technology hasn’t been considered by the legislators, it would normally be
considered legal.29 So the example isn’t very convincing.30
But, taking a cue from our discussion of Moral Error Theory, we can
construct a better example: Consider an act φ in a state of nature, where there is
no legal system in place. It seems that neither to φ nor to not φ would be legally
required (obligatory), permitted, or forbidden, because there wouldn’t be any
legal system or law that could require, permit, or prohibit these acts.31 Hence
we must reject the legal analogues of (1), (2), (5), and (6). The upshot is that, in
the same way as legal permissibility isn’t the mere absence of legal prohibition,
moral permissibility isn’t the mere absence of moral prohibition. And, as with
the corresponding legal analogues, we have that neither moral obligation nor
moral prohibition is the mere absence of moral permissibility.
If, as von Wright maintains, permissibility entails something “over and
above” non-prohibition, then this “over and above” might be false and then
acts might fail to be permissible even if, as Moral Error Theory entails, no acts
are prohibited.
Unlike (1), (2), (5), and (6), the standard interdefinability of obligation and
prohibition (which von Wright is less worried about in the above quote) does
not rule out Moral Error Theory. To see this, note that—unlike (1), (2), (5), and
(6)—the following definitions do not define a first-order moral claim in terms of
a negated first-order moral claim:
(7) It is obligatory to φ =df it is forbidden to not φ.
32
(8) It is forbidden to φ =df it is obligatory to not φ.
33
Both of these definitions avoid ruling out Moral Error Theory, since both
definienda and definientia are first-order moral claims; hence their definienda
and definientia are jointly false on Moral Error Theory.34
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Von Wright wonders what, more precisely, distinguishes permissibility from
mere non-prohibition:
I think we are well advised to distinguish between things being permitted in the
weak sense of simply not being forbidden and things being permitted in some
stronger sense. Exactly in what this stronger sense “consists” may be difficult to
tell. That which is in the strong sense permitted is, somehow, expressly permit-
ted, subject to norm—and not just void of deontic status altogether.35
Von Wright’s first suggestion for what distinguishes permission in the strong
sense from mere non-prohibition was in terms of immunity from punishment:
I shall say that there is a strong permission to do an action, if and only if, com-
mission of this action is a sufficient condition of immunity to punishment for it.
The holder of a strong permission can do the action and be sure that he will
not, on that account, have to suffer a punitive reaction on the part of the legal
authorities or the community, as the case may be.36
The problem with this proposal is that, on many ethical theories, the question
of whether someone should be punished does not depend on whether they only
performed permissible acts. Notoriously, utilitarianism entails that one ought to
punish an innocent person if doing so would bring about the greatest sum total
of happiness in the situation.
Nevertheless, the account von Wright ends up finding most attractive (even
though he doesn’t fully defend it) is an account of permissibility as declarations
of toleration, which, he writes,
can be regarded either as declarations of intention not to interfere with the
permission-holder’s conduct in a certain respect, or as a sort of promise of non-
interference. A promise of this kind [...] might be viewed as a self-prohibition on
the part of the permission-giver.37
This approach, as von Wright points out, offers a way to define permissibility in
terms of prohibition—and then, via (8), permissibility in terms of obligation.38
Yet a problem with this account is that it doesn’t seem to fit with moral
permissibility on many ethical theories. On many ethical theories, when some
act φ is permissible this isn’t due to some authority permitting this act; rather, it
is due to the act’s conforming to an impersonal moral law or principle.39
This last observation, however, suggests the following way to distin-
guish permissibility from mere non-prohibition: Moral permissibility has moral
import—that is, its being permissible to do some act entails that there is a moral
law. Its being morally permissible to φ means, roughly, that φ conforms with
the moral law. Similarly, its being morally forbidden to φ means that φ violates
the moral law. And its being morally obligatory to φ means that φ is required
by the moral law. So its being permissible (forbidden, obligatory) to φ entails
that there is a moral law. But merely its being not obligatory (not forbidden, not
permissible) to φ does not entail that there is a moral law.
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Thus we see why (1), (2), (5), and (6) all fail. Their definienda entail that
there is a moral law, but their definientia do not.
4. Obligation in terms of permissibility
There is, however, a way to define obligation in terms of permissibility which
avoids this problem, namely:
(9) It is obligatory to φ =df it is permissible to φ and it is not permissible to
not φ.
In this definition, definiendum and definiens each makes at least one positive
claim about obligations or permissibility. So (given that permissibility has moral
import) definiendum and definiens each entails that there is a moral law.40
Moreover, (9) is consistent with Moral Error Theory, since the falsity of its
being obligatory to φ only entails the falsity of its being permissible to φ and not
permissible to not φ. The latter claim is false according to Moral Error Theory,
since its first conjunct is a first-order moral claim. Hence (9) avoids the conflict
with Moral Error Theory, since Moral Error Theory entails that both definien-
dum and definiens are false.
But (9) has another problem: It rules out the possibility of obligation
dilemmas, that is, a form of moral dilemmas where, for some act φ, it is both
obligatory to φ and obligatory to not φ.41 To see this, assume that it is obliga-
tory to φ and obligatory to not φ. Given that it’s obligatory to φ, (9) entails that
it is not permissible to not φ. And, given that it’s obligatory to not φ, (9) entails
that it is permissible to not φ. Hence we have a contradiction.
It may be objected that we could avoid ruling out obligation dilemmas if
we, instead of (9), adopted the following variant:
(10) It is obligatory to φ =df it is not permissible to not φ and there is
some possible act χ such that it would be permissible to χ .42
While (10) allows for obligation dilemmas, it is open to a variation of the same
problem. Consider a maximally prescriptive view, where, for all acts φ, it is both
obligatory to φ and obligatory to not φ and no act is permissible. It may be
objected that some acts cannot not be done; so, if these acts are obligatory,
it cannot be obligatory to not do them, since ought implies can. But, if we
have no choice about such acts, it seems that they needn’t be in the domain of
acts which moral theories cover, because moral theories are often restricted to
free, volitional acts.43 Hence the maximally prescriptive view need not assign a
deontic status to these non-voluntary acts.44 While the maximally prescriptive
view is normatively strange, it doesn’t seem to be based on a confusion of the
concept of obligation, at least, it doesn’t seem to do so if obligation dilemmas
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are conceptually possible. Yet (10) rules out the maximally prescriptive view,
because (10) entails that no acts would be obligatory if there were no possible
permissible acts. Hence (10) doesn’t seem to have any advantage over (9), which
is simpler and less ad hoc.
Could there be some other definition of obligation in terms of permissibility
which avoids these problems? If we wish to allow for the conceptual possibility
of obligation dilemmas, there couldn’t. Consider again the maximally prescrip-
tive view where all acts are obligatory and no acts are permissible. In terms
of permissibility, the maximally prescriptive view is extensionally equivalent to
Moral Error Theory, since both entail that no acts are permissible. But, in terms
of obligation, the maximally prescriptive view differs from Moral Error Theory:
on the maximally prescriptive view, all acts are obligatory; on Moral Error The-
ory, no acts are obligatory. No definition of obligation in terms of permissibility
could account for this difference.
5. Permissibility in terms of obligation or prohibition?
Could we avoid these problems if we instead define permissibility in terms of
obligation or prohibition? We cannot. The trouble is that an adequate defini-
tion of permissibility shouldn’t rule out a maximally permissive view where all
acts are permissible and nothing is obligatory or forbidden. And, if we wish to
neither rule out this maximally permissive view nor rule out Moral Error The-
ory, no definition of permissibility in terms of obligation or prohibition could
possibly work. To see this, note that, on both the maximally permissive view
and Moral Error Theory, nothing is obligatory and nothing is prohibited. So, in
terms of obligation and prohibition, these two cases are equivalent. But they are
different in terms of permissibility: on the maximally permissible view, all acts
are permissible; on Moral Error Theory, no acts are. Since these cases differ in
terms of permissibility but not in terms of obligation or prohibition, permissi-
bility cannot plausibly be defined in terms of obligation or prohibition.45
6. Prohibition in terms of permissibility
If obligation dilemmas are conceptually impossible, then (9) is a plausible def-
inition of obligation in terms of permissibility. Combining (9) with (8), we get a
definition of prohibition directly in terms of permissibility:
(11) It is forbidden to φ =df it is not permissible to φ and it is permissible
to not φ.46
This proposal avoids the conflict with Moral Error Theory, since both
the definienda and last conjunct of the definientia of (11) are first-order
moral claims.
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A possible drawback of (11) is that it rules out another form of moral
dilemmas. It rules out the possibility of prohibition dilemmas, that is, a form of
moral dilemmas where, for some act φ, it is jointly forbidden to φ and forbidden
to not φ.47 To see this, assume that it is forbidden to φ and forbidden to not φ.
Given that it’s forbidden to φ, (11) entails that it is permissible to not φ. And,
given that it’s forbidden to not φ, (11) entails that it is not permissible to not φ.
Hence we have a contradiction.
7. The only feasible deontic primitive
We have seen that both (9) and (11) rule out moral dilemmas. Nevertheless, the
conceptual possibility of moral dilemmas (such as obligation and prohibition
dilemmas) is controversial.48 If moral dilemmas were conceptually impossible,
it seems credible that they would be ruled out by the definitions of the de-
ontic concepts. And, if we aren’t worried about ruling out moral dilemmas, there
seems to be no reason to reject (9) or (11).49
Thus, with (9) and (11), we have plausible definitions of both obligation and
prohibition in terms of permissibility—that is, plausible if we can pass over the
conceptual possibility of moral dilemmas. Since we have seen that permissibility
cannot be defined in terms of obligation or prohibition, we have that permissi-
bility is the only feasible deontic primitive.50
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standard deontic logic:
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See Føllesdal and Hilpinen 1971, p. 13. Since Moral Error Theory seems
logically consistent, the Principle of Tautological Obligation cannot plausibly be
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23. While Mackie (1946, p. 90; 1977, p. 9), Pigden (2007, p. 453), Olson (2014, p. 14),
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right among the first-order claims that are false on their moral error theories,
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other things being equal. Olson (2014, p. 14) also makes the following point:
But Mackie’s contention that his error theory is purely a second-order view
and as such logically independent of any first order view must be taken to
include the first-order moral view that anything is morally permissible. In
other words, Mackie’s moral error theory holds that all first order moral
claims are false and claims about moral permissibility are no exception.
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This is puzzling: If Moral Error Theory entails that first order views are false,
Moral Error Theory and these first order views are logically dependent rather
than independent. Unlike Olson, I don’t think that Mackie denies that Moral
Error Theory (even though it is a second-order view) has a logical dependency
with first-order moral views. Olson’s interpretation might seem plausible given
Mackie’s (1977, p. 16) claim that
These first and second order views are not merely distinct but completely
independent: one could be a second order moral sceptic without being a first
order one, or again the other way around.
But Mackie does not claim here that all first and second order views are in-
dependent. By ‘[t]hese first and second order views’, Mackie refers to the two
particular first and second order views he mentions earlier on the same page as
the above quote. He only claims that whether someone is a moral sceptic of the
first order in the sense that they express a positive moral condemnation of all that
conventionally passes for morality is independent of whether they accept Moral
Error Theory. Mackie is not saying that all second-order moral judgements are
logically independent of all first-order moral judgements. My reading is also sug-
gested by the ‘not necessarily’ weakening in Mackie’s (1977, p. 22) claim that
‘first order judgements are not necessarily affected by the truth or falsity of a
second order view.’
27. Von Wright 1981, p. 6. See also von Wright 1963, pp. 85–87.
28. Von Wright 1963, p. 86; 1971, p. 166.
29. Kelsen 1949, pp. 146–149 and Ross 1968, pp. 121–122.
30. See Bulygin and Alchourrón 2015, pp. 327–329 for similar examples.
31. Williams 1985, p. 62 similarly claims
If there is a system of rules, then no doubt if the rules are silent on a certain
matter (at least if the rules are otherwise wide enough in their scope), that
fact can naturally be taken to mean permission. The law, like other sovereign
agencies, can say something by remaining silent. But if there is no law, then
silence is not meaningful, permissive, silence: it is simply silence.
32. Von Wright 1951a, p. 3; 1951b, p. 37.
33. Hintikka 1957, pp. 4–5. Kanger (1957, p. 9) defines wrongness in this manner.
34. Hintikka (1957, pp. 5–6) objects to (7) and (8). He argues that its being obligatory
to φ is a shorthand for its being obligatory that there is some act which is an
instance of φ, and that its being forbidden to φ is a shorthand for its being, for all
acts x, obligatory that x is not an instance of φ. If this is correct, then (7) and (8)
are inadequate. This objection, however, only applies if the objects of obligation
and prohibition are kinds of acts rather than individual acts, which is what we
are concerned with. See also Cox 1978 for an objection to Hintikka’s argument.
35. Von Wright 1981, p. 25.
36. Von Wright 1969, p. 95.
37. Von Wright 1989, p. 867. See also von Wright 1963, p. 92; 1999, p. 37.
38. Von Wright 1989, p. 867.
39. This objection also applies to Alchourrón’s (1969, p. 251) analysis of strong per-
missibility as the existence of an act issuing a permission norm.
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40. If we wish to preserve the analogy with alethic modalities, we would have to
define necessity as follows:
(III) p =df ♦p & ¬♦¬p
Given (III), we can still derive the standard duality biconditionals, p ⇔ ¬♦¬p
and ♦p ⇔ ¬¬p, if we adopt the axiom that at least one of p and its negation is
possible, that is, ♦p ∨ ♦¬p. In terms of Kripke’s (1963, p. 84) semantics (giving
up the reflexivity of the accessibility relation), it seems weird that, in a dead-
end world with no access to any possible worlds, we have p even though ¬♦p.
We avoid this consequence of the duality definitions if we instead adopt (III).
Likewise, if we would like to keep the analogy with existential modalities—see
von Wright 1951b, p. 2—we need to replace the standard duality definitions of
the quantifiers with the following:
(IV) ∀xF =df ∃xF & ¬∃x¬F
The difference is that universal affirmative claims have existential import
given (IV) but not given the standard duality definitions, championed by Venn
(1881, pp. 141–143). Carroll (1896, p. 33; 1977, pp. 74–75, 88) opts for (IV) and
argues that universal claims do have existential import. Carroll’s (1896, pp. 165–
170; 1977, pp. 232–237) argument, however, seems to rely on (IV), so it isn’t
very convincing; see Carroll 1977, p. 233n2 and Quine 1977, p. 1018. Bartley
(1977, p. 35) and Abeles (2010, pp. 14–15) suggest that, later on, Carroll may
have changed his mind about existential import.
41. Vallentyne 1989, p. 302.
42. Alchourrón and Bulygin (1971, p. 42) state the corresponding equivalence, but
they (1971, p. 38) define obligation with (1).
43. Moore’s (1912, pp. 16–17) version of utilitarianism, for example, only applies
‘right’ and ‘wrong’ to voluntary acts.
44. It may next be objected that the maximally prescriptive view violates
The Principle of Entailment If doing φ entails doing χ , then it is obligatory
to χ if it is obligatory to φ.
See Kanger 1957, p. 32 and Stenius 1963, p. 252; 1982, p. 56. If you perform an
act φ, then it seems that you must also perform the tautological act to either φ or
not φ. So, by the Principle of Entailment, this tautological act is obligatory if φ is
obligatory. The trouble is that the maximally prescriptive view is then committed
to not only that these tautological acts are obligatory but also that it is obligatory
to not do these tautological acts. So the maximally prescriptive view would be
committed to impossible acts being obligatory. Yet the Principle of Entailment
is implausible. It is open to Ross’s (1941, p. 62) counter-example that, if it is
obligatory to post a letter, the Principle of Entailment entails that it is obligatory
to post or burn the letter. So, if you burn the letter, you do something you ought
to do. The Principle of Entailment can also conflict with Act Consequentialism;
see Wedberg 1969, p. 223. Suppose that the consequences of posting the letter
are better than those of any alternative act, such as, burning the letter. Then, if
one burns the letter, to post or burn the letter has worse consequences than to
post the letter; so only the latter is obligatory on Act Consequentialism.
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45. This argument also shows that bilateral permissibility cannot be defined in terms
of obligation, changing what needs to be changed.
46. Alchourrón and Bulygin (1971, p. 42) state the corresponding equivalence, but
they (1971, p. 38) define prohibition with (5).
47. Vallentyne 1992, p. 118.
48. See Mason 1996 for a short summary of some of the debate on the alleged
possibility of moral dilemmas. One of the main arguments for the possibility
of moral dilemmas is blocked by (9). Lemmon (1962, pp. 149–150) argues that
‘must φ’ and ‘must not φ’ are contrary since ‘must φ’ entails ‘will φ’ and ‘must
not φ’ entails ‘will not φ’, which contradicts ‘will φ’. And Lemmon claims that
we cannot derive a similar contradiction from ‘obligatory to φ’ and ‘obligatory
to not φ’. Given (9), however, ‘obligatory to φ’ entails ‘permissible to φ’ and
‘obligatory to not φ’ entails ‘not permissible to φ’. Hence we get a contradiction
similar to the one we got from the combination of ‘must φ’ and ‘must not φ’.
Marcus (1980, p. 129) suggests that moral laws or rules are consistent if ‘there
are possible circumstances in which no conflict will emerge’: moral rules can be
consistent even if they yield conflicting moral dilemmas in some circumstances.
But this suggestion assumes that moral dilemmas don’t yield contradictions.
Hence the suggestion is point-assuming as a challenge to (9), which entails that
this assumption is false.
49. It may be objected that this conflicts with our allowing for the conceptual pos-
sibility of Moral Error Theory, because the latter implies that we allow for the
conceptual possibility of situations where no acts are permitted. Hence we allow
for situations where all acts are impermissible (in the sense of not being permit-
ted). Personally, I do not think these situations should count as moral dilemmas.
But, if they should, we can allow for such dilemmas even though we rule out
other kinds of dilemmas such as obligation and prohibition dilemmas.
50. This goes against the tradition in deontic logic, which has mainly taken obliga-
tion as the primitive; see Hansson 2013, p. 205. Stenius (1982, p. 66–67) argues
that obligation is a better primitive because it is easier to get an intuitive grasp
on than permissibility. Yet this seems to be an unavoidable cost if we are to
adequately define one of obligation and permissibility in terms of the other.
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